Kue tahun baru

Meja: Kocok putih telur hingga mengembang tiga kali lipat, lalu tambahkan gula dan aduk hingga menjadi meringue yang mengilap.

Gosok kuning telur dengan minyak membentuk mayones tipis, lalu tuangkan di atas putih telur dan aduk ringan dengan sendok kayu.

Tepung, coklat dan baking powder ditambahkan di akhir hujan, menggabungkan semua bahan, aduk perlahan.

Siapkan bentuk bulat yang kita tutup dengan kertas roti dan masukkan seluruh komposisi bagian atas yang kita masukkan ke dalam oven selama 35 menit dengan api yang tepat.

sirup: Masukkan air, gula, dan esens rum ke dalam ketel, biarkan mendidih.

krim putih: Aduk rata whipped cream hingga mengeras, tambahkan madu, susu, lalu agar-agar digunakan sesuai petunjuk. Terakhir tambahkan esens vanila dan aduk semuanya. Biarkan dingin hingga cake menyatu.

krim hitam: Kami menyiapkan panci yang kami taruh di atas bain marie. Cokelat yang dilelehkan ringan bersama dengan krim kocok dan mentega kami masukkan ke dalam panci dan biarkan cokelat meleleh sambil terus diaduk. Ketika mencapai titik didih kami angkat dari kompor dan tunggu sampai dingin.

Lapisan: Campur semua bahan dalam bain marie dan biarkan mendidih sebentar.

perakitan:

Kami mengambil bagian atas kue dan memotongnya menjadi 3. Kami membuat sirup di bagian bawah, tambahkan sebagian krim putih, lalu '' strip '' krim hitam tipis dan biarkan agak dingin. Kemudian kami kembali dengan lapisan lain krim putih dan lanjutkan dengan bagian meja berikutnya (ke-2), sirup, put, krim putih dan hitam, lalu bagian terakhir meja dan hiasi dengan icing, krim, dan ceri.

Kue yang sangat tinggi dan buuunnn untuk dicicipi!



Pelecehan seksual

Status undang-undang pembatasan kasus pelecehan seksual di New York saat ini diringkas oleh Konferensi Nasional Badan Legislatif Negara Bagian sebagai berikut:

“Di New York, tidak ada perpanjangan undang-undang pembatasan untuk pelecehan seksual, namun jika pelecehan diperlakukan sebagai gugatan yang disengaja, SOL New York & # 8217s adalah satu tahun. NY Prak. Hukum 215. Jika korban mengajukan tuntutan terhadap gereja atau sekolah yang mengelola pelaku, atau tindakan apa pun yang didasarkan pada kelalaian, daripada perilaku kriminal, SOL adalah 3 tahun & # 8211 N.Y. Prak. Hukum 214. New York mengadopsi undang-undang pembatasan khusus bagi korban kejahatan seksual pada tahun 2006 & # 8211 N.Y. Prak. Hukum 213-c. Undang-undang menetapkan bahwa tindakan untuk ganti rugi perdata untuk kejahatan seksual yang ditentukan, termasuk pelecehan seksual terhadap anak di bawah umur, dapat diajukan dalam waktu 5 tahun sejak tindakan yang merupakan pelanggaran seksual. ”

Sebuah undang-undang yang diusulkan, yang dikenal sebagai “Undang-Undang Reformasi Pelecehan Seksual Anak,” [A.01042 (Prestlow)] akan mengubah CPLR dengan menambahkan bagian 213-d yang akan memperpanjang SOL dari 3 menjadi 6 tahun waktu untuk membawa tindakan di mana penggugat dinonaktifkan sebagai akibat dari masa kanak-kanak / kegilaan pada saat tindakan tersebut terjadi. Itu juga akan menambahkan undang-undang kebangkitan 2 tahun untuk tindakan apa pun yang sebelumnya dilarang oleh SOL. Pada tanggal 9 Januari 2013, dirujuk ke Codes Committee. Ini adalah tagihan satu rumah, tanpa tagihan Senat yang sebanding. RUU lain, A.04008 (Gabyszak), dengan multi-sponsor, mengusulkan penambahan bagian 214-f ke CPLR, yang akan memperpanjang SOL hingga 15 tahun undang-undang tersebut, dimulai setelah periode tol saat ini untuk masa bayi atau setelah pelaporan insiden, mana yang lebih dulu. RUU ini telah diperkenalkan di sesi legislatif dari tahun 2003 hingga 2009. RUU ini diperkenalkan pada tanggal 30 Januari 2013, dan mengacu pada Kode.


Penggunaan Dan Penyalahgunaan Hukum Tort Di Era COVID-19

Kami berada di dunia baru yang berani, seperti yang Anda semua tahu. Pengacara gugatan, baik pengacara pihak penggugat dan pembela, memprediksi serangan gencar kasus. Beberapa dari kasus ini akan menjadi penerapan doktrin Tort yang tidak kontroversial pada situasi baru yang diciptakan oleh COVID-19. Kasus-kasus lain akan mendorong batas-batas hukum Tort, yang mensyaratkan pertanggungjawaban tiga serangkai kesalahan, sebab-akibat, dan kerusakan. Tuntutan konvensional pasti mengikuti jalur hukumnya, tetapi gugatan yang tidak konvensional harus dicegah oleh pengadilan atau dilarang oleh undang-undang. Berikut ini ikhtisar singkat (dan, yang penting, tidak lengkap):

NEW YORK, NY - 14 APRIL: Sebuah toko ritel tetap tutup pada 14 April 2020 di wilayah Brooklyn di New. [+] Kota York. Lebih dari 2.100 toko ritel nasional telah mengumumkan penutupan total tahun ini. Kota New York tetap menjadi pusat pandemi virus corona di Amerika Serikat. (Foto oleh Robert Nickelsberg / Getty Images)

Setelan Konvensional:

Gugatan tersebut telah diajukan terhadap operator kapal pesiar, panti jompo, dan tempat hiburan. Kadang-kadang, tapi tidak selalu, akan mudah untuk membangun kelalaian (misalnya, jika COVID telah diumumkan kepada publik jika sebagian besar orang lain di industri yang sama telah mengambil langkah-langkah pencegahan yang tidak dilakukan oleh terdakwa, dll.). Kadang-kadang, tapi tidak selalu, akan mudah untuk membangun hal menyebabkan (misalnya, beberapa orang yang terinfeksi virus berada di lokasi yang sangat tertutup seperti panti jompo atau kapal pesiar, dan dengan pengetahuan kami tentang masa inkubasi, masuk akal untuk menyimpulkan bahwa mereka tertular virus corona di lokasi tersebut). Kadang-kadang, tapi tidak selalu, akan mudah untuk membangun ganti rugi (Sangat mudah jika orang yang sebelumnya sehat terkena virus corona dan meninggal tidak begitu mudah jika penggugat tidak pernah mengalami gejala tetapi menggugat "takut virus corona".).

Di mana ada sedikit bukti kelalaian (misalnya, di mana pabrik membuat pemisahan sosial dan peralatan yang disanitasi setelah pandemi diumumkan), penilaian singkat harus diberikan kepada terdakwa. Bahkan jika ada kelalaian dalam kasus tertentu, penyebabnya mungkin sulit dibuktikan: mungkin pompa bensin seharusnya lebih sering disanitasi, tetapi bagaimana Pak Smith bisa membuktikan bahwa dia mungkin tertular virus corona di pompa itu? Sebaliknya, sebab-akibat mungkin mudah dibuktikan (misalnya, narapidana dengan virus corona jelas tertular penyakit di dalam penjara), tetapi mungkin tidak ada kelalaian (jika, misalnya, pengoperasian penjara dengan cara lain tidak mungkin dilakukan).

Ini adalah kesalahan baterai yang disengaja. Memang jarang terjadi baterai seperti itu, tetapi pernah terjadi. Baterai adalah perbuatan melawan hukum dan kejahatan. Jika korban dites dengan cepat dan positif virus corona, penyebabnya dapat disimpulkan.

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Setelan tidak konvensional:

  • Bisnis saya ditutup oleh pemerintah, atau (dengan hati-hati) oleh saya karena pandemi, dan Anda menolak membayar saya meskipun ada asuransi gangguan bisnis yang saya ambil dengan perusahaan Anda.

Jika polis asuransi gangguan bisnis tidak mengandung pengecualian untuk pandemi atau keadaan darurat yang diperintahkan pemerintah, ini menjadi gugatan yang agak konvensional. Masalahnya adalah bahwa asuransi gangguan bisnis biasanya mengecualikan pertanggungan untuk penyakit menular seperti virus corona, dan sering kali mengecualikannya untuk keadaan darurat pemerintah. [Ini karena kerusakan massal sulit untuk diasuransikan kembali. Untuk alasan yang sama, asuransi pemilik rumah biasanya mengecualikan kerusakan akibat banjir, yang dapat mempengaruhi semua rumah di area tertentu. Tekanan saat ini diberikan pada pemerintah federal dan negara bagian untuk memaksa perusahaan asuransi membayar klaim gangguan bisnis terlepas dari bahasa kebijakan. Industri restoran, terbatas pada layanan take-out dan pengiriman oleh undang-undang negara bagian, dapat kehilangan $ 225 miliar dalam penjualan selama tiga bulan ke depan. Siapa yang harus membayar kerugian ini, pemilik bisnis atau pemerintah atau perusahaan asuransi? Koalisi koki terkenal (termasuk Wolfgang Puck, Daniel Boulud, dan Jean-Georges Vongerichten) telah menciptakan Grup Gangguan Bisnis. BESAR tampaknya telah melobi Presiden Trump untuk menghukum perusahaan asuransi, atau mungkin mensubsidi mereka agar membayar terlepas dari kontrak mereka. Bagaimanapun, sejumlah besar tuntutan hukum telah diajukan oleh pemilik restoran.

RUU yang sedang disusun di New Jersey dapat menempatkan perusahaan asuransi tertentu pada kerugian akibat gangguan bisnis karena wabah COVID-19, terlepas dari pengecualian apa pun yang mungkin dimiliki oleh polis asuransi mereka. Undang-undang semacam itu mungkin memiliki kelemahan konstitusional yang serius di bawah klausul Kontrak, kecuali jika itu hanya berlaku untuk kontrak yang dibuat setelah RUU itu diadopsi.

  • Anda atau produk Anda menyelamatkan saya dengan buruk. Kantor dokter Anda, atau rumah sakit Anda, adalah tempat saya tertular virus corona. Atau, topeng atau sarung tangan yang Anda buat gagal melindungi saya. Atau, vaksin anti-COVID-19 (setelah dikembangkan) tidak bekerja untuk saya.

Masalah hukum dengan gugatan semacam itu sangat banyak. Mendirikan kelalaian akan sulit: apa, dalam pandangan ke depan (meninjau ke belakang 20/20) yang dilakukan dokter atau rumah sakit? Bagaimana dan dengan biaya berapa topeng atau sarung tangan itu bisa dibuat “sempurna?” Mendirikan hal menyebabkan juga akan sulit: bagaimana kita tahu bahwa korban tertular virus corona di kantor dokter itu, atau ketika dia menggunakan topeng yang diduga keropos? Kesulitan dari tuntutan tersebut, dikombinasikan dengan sisi negatif dari "aturan Amerika" (yang memaksa terdakwa yang dituntut untuk membayar biaya pengacara mereka sendiri, bahkan jika mereka ditemukan tidak bertanggung jawab, dan oleh karena itu menyebabkan terdakwa yang sama sekali tidak melakukan apa-apa salah untuk diselesaikan) adalah argumen yang sangat baik untuk adopsi undang-undang kekebalan COVID-19 yang mendukung penyelamat dan produsen vaksin. Tanggung jawab harus dibatasi pada kasus (sangat jarang) di mana ada cacat produksi yang menyebabkan kerugian (misalnya, jika suatu batch vaksin terkontaminasi dengan zat asing yang menghasilkan "tanda tangan" yang membahayakan orang yang menerima batch yang terkontaminasi).

Dokter yang meresepkan obat, yang telah disetujui FDA untuk penggunaan lain, kepada pasien COVID-19 juga harus dilindungi oleh undang-undang dari tanggung jawab jika obat tersebut tidak berfungsi, selama literatur ilmiah mendukung penggunaannya untuk tujuan ini. "Resep tanpa label," demikian sebutannya, sangat umum sehingga hampir setiap obat digunakan tanpa label dalam beberapa keadaan. Akan lalai untuk tidak meresepkan hidroksiklorokuin kepada pasien COVID-19 dalam banyak kasus, misalnya.

Pada 27 Maret, Presiden Trump menandatangani undang-undang H.R. 748, “Undang-Undang Bantuan, Pertolongan, dan Keamanan Ekonomi Corona” (UU CARES). Undang-undang ini mencakup apa yang disebut bahasa "Orang Samaria yang Baik Hati" yang memberikan perlindungan federal terhadap tanggung jawab profesional perawatan kesehatan sukarela selama tanggap darurat COVID-19 (lihat bagian 3215). Ini, menurut saya, merupakan perkembangan yang disambut baik.

  • Saya tertekan oleh pengangguran atau dana pensiun saya berkurang karena penutupan pasar saham.

Kasus-kasus yang meresahkan ini seringkali merusak tanpa kesalahan. Pemerintah mendikte penutupan banyak industri, dan apakah menurut Anda pilihan kebijakan mereka benar atau tidak, itu pasti masuk akal. Demikian pula, pedagang pasti berhak untuk menutup dan merumahkan karyawan jika pendapatan tidak mencukupi setelah pandemi menyerang. Kesulitan ekonomi paling baik ditangani secara publik, seperti yang dilakukan oleh CARES terhadap mereka yang dirugikan secara langsung. Kerugian ekonomi tidak langsung (depresi mengurangi pendapatan pensiun) biasanya tidak dikompensasikan dalam Tort, dan paling baik dilihat sebagai risiko investasi dan kehidupan. Tekanan psikologis, meskipun nyata, juga tidak dikompensasikan karena kesulitan dalam memisahkan kerusakan nyata dari kerusakan yang dipalsukan. “Bahaya moral” inilah yang menjadi alasan mengapa Common Law Torts tidak mengizinkan kesalahan akibat kelalaian yang menimbulkan tekanan emosional. Di mana tidak ada kelalaian, bahkan lebih sedikit alasan untuk memberi kompensasi.

Saya bisa melanjutkan, tetapi saya pikir saya telah merangkum jenis-jenis tuntutan hukum utama yang telah dan akan didorong oleh COVID-19. Saya belum membahas gugatan terhadap China, meskipun - jika negara itu dengan lalai membiarkan virus menyebar ke luar negeri dengan menyembunyikannya dari seluruh dunia, pengkhianatannya kemungkinan menjadi penyebab triliunan dolar kerusakan nyata. Seperti yang ditunjukkan oleh rekan pengacara saya Stephen Carter, kekebalan berdaulat melindungi kesalahan besar ini dari tanggung jawab (meskipun tuntutan hukum Quixotic telah diajukan di AS dan di Israel).


Penyiksaan Anak di Bawah Umur

Tort:
Sekumpulan hak, kewajiban, dan pemulihan yang diterapkan oleh pengadilan dalam proses perdata untuk memberikan bantuan kepada orang-orang yang telah menderita kerugian dari tindakan salah orang lain. Orang yang menderita luka atau menderita kerugian berupa uang sebagai akibat dari perbuatan melawan hukum dikenal sebagai penggugat, dan orang yang bertanggung jawab untuk menimbulkan luka dan menimbulkan tanggung jawab atas kerusakan tersebut dikenal sebagai tergugat atau pelaku perbuatan melawan hukum.
Tiga unsur harus ditetapkan dalam setiap perbuatan melawan hukum. Pertama, penggugat harus menetapkan bahwa tergugat berada di bawah kewajiban hukum untuk bertindak dengan cara tertentu. Kedua, penggugat harus menunjukkan bahwa tergugat melanggar kewajiban ini dengan tidak menyesuaikan diri dengan perilakunya. Ketiga, penggugat harus membuktikan bahwa mereka menderita luka atau kerugian sebagai akibat langsung dari pelanggaran tergugat.
Hukum gugatan berasal dari kombinasi prinsip-prinsip hukum umum dan undang-undang yang berlaku. Berbeda dengan tindakan wanprestasi, tindakan wanprestasi tidak bergantung pada kesepakatan antara para pihak dalam gugatan. Berbeda dengan penuntutan pidana yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah, perbuatan melawan hukum dilakukan oleh warga negara. Remedies untuk tindakan menyiksa termasuk uang kerusakan dan perintah (perintah pengadilan memaksa atau melarang perilaku tertentu). Pelanggar hukum tidak dikenakan denda atau kurungan di pengadilan sipil.

Praduga yang Dapat Dibantah:
Dalam hukum pembuktian, suatu anggapan yang dapat dibantah atau dibantah jika bukti yang berlawanan diperkenalkan. Selanjutnya beban pembuktian beralih ke pihak lain.

Kewajiban perwakilan:
Pengenaan tanggung jawab kerugian pada satu orang (yang tidak secara langsung bertanggung jawab atas cedera), untuk perilaku orang lain hanya berdasarkan hubungan antara dua orang.

Tanggung Jawab Anak di Bawah Umur untuk Kerugian Sendiri

Seorang di bawah umur bertanggung jawab atas kesalahannya sendiri. Namun, pengadilan seringkali akan menerapkan standar yang lebih lunak. Dalam menentukan tanggung jawab wanprestasi bagi anak, ada aturan khusus, biasanya berdasarkan usia anak di bawah umur. Secara historis, ada tes garis terang berdasarkan usia anak. Secara khusus:

  • Di bawah usia 7 tahun: Seorang anak tidak bisa lalai.
  • Antara usia 7 dan 14: Ada anggapan yang dapat dibantah bahwa anak tidak mungkin lalai.
  • Antara usia 14 dan 21: Ada anggapan yang dapat dibantah bahwa anak tersebut mampu melakukan kelalaian.

CONTOH: Ted berusia 6 tahun ketika dia terluka setelah berlari di depan mobil. Sopir berargumen bahwa Ted secara kontributif lalai secara hukum. Pengadilan yang lebih rendah menyatakan bahwa anak tidak bisa lalai karena usianya. Namun, di tingkat banding, pengadilan memutuskan bahwa juri harus dapat memutuskan apakah, berdasarkan fakta dan keadaan kasus ini dan karakteristik anak ini, Ted dapat dianggap lalai. Lihat, misalnya, Tyler v. Weed, 280 N.W. 827 (Mich. 1938). Lihat juga, Tukang roti v. Alt, 132 N.W. 2d 614 (Mich. 1965).

Penggunaan tes subjektif, telah menggantikan penggunaan tes usia kronologis yang lama. Tes ini berkaitan dengan kemampuan anak tertentu untuk mengenali dan menghindari risiko dan bahaya. Faktor-faktor yang dipertimbangkan dalam analisis ini meliputi:

Mengingat perbedaan dalam tingkat perkembangan anak, tes ini dapat menilai kesalahan seorang anak dengan lebih akurat.

CONTOH: Albert (usia 12) terluka oleh peluru dari pistol yang dikeluarkan oleh sepupunya, George (usia 12), saat mereka bermain di sebuah pondok milik kakek mereka. Dalam upaya untuk mengalahkan tindakan pelanggaran yang dilakukan oleh Albert terhadap George dan kakeknya, George mengandalkan usianya untuk membebaskan dirinya dari rasa bersalah atas tindakannya. Jika tes usia kronologis dapat diterapkan, akan ada anggapan bahwa George tidak mungkin lalai. Sebaliknya, pengadilan banding menegaskan pengadilan pengadilan menemukan bahwa George dan kakeknya bertanggung jawab atas cedera Albert. Pengadilan menemukan bahwa George "berkewajiban untuk melakukan perawatan yang wajar, yang diukur dengan 'kehati-hatian yang wajar' bahwa anak di bawah umur lainnya dengan usia, pengalaman, kapasitas, dan perkembangan biasanya akan berolahraga dalam keadaan yang sama." EEA Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957).

Standar berubah ketika anak di bawah umur melakukan aktivitas orang dewasa, seperti mengendarai mobil atau menerbangkan pesawat. Dalam hal ini, anak diperlakukan dengan standar yang sama dengan orang dewasa.

CONTOH: David yang berusia 15 tahun tewas saat sepeda motor yang dikendarainya bertabrakan dengan mobil pengemudinya. Di persidangan, pengemudi keberatan dengan standar minor, yang menyatakan karena orang yang meninggal berusia di bawah 21 tahun pada saat kecelakaan, ia dianggap di bawah umur dan tidak harus diperlakukan dengan tingkat perawatan yang sama seperti orang dewasa. Sebaliknya, dikatakan bahwa orang yang meninggal itu diharuskan untuk melakukan pengasuhan terhadap rata-rata anak seusianya, pengalaman dan tahap perkembangan mentalnya. Atas instruksi juri itu, juri mengembalikan vonis yang mendukung administrator harta milik David. Di tingkat banding, pengadilan memutuskan bahwa standar perawatan yang benar adalah standar perawatan orang dewasa karena David (meskipun di bawah umur) mengoperasikan kendaraan bermotor. Lihat, misalnya, Daniels v. Evans, 224 H.2d 63 (N.H. 1966). Dengan demikian, setidaknya David bisa dianggap sebagai penyebab kelalaian dalam kecelakaan itu.

Tanggung Jawab Orang Tua atas Gugatan Anak di Bawah Umur

Sebuah survei dari berbagai acara televisi hakim akan mengungkapkan cukup banyak tuntutan hukum terhadap anak di bawah umur. Seringkali, penggugat mencoba untuk mengumpulkan restitusi dari orang tua untuk perilaku menyiksa anak di bawah umur. Dalam keadaan tertentu, orang tua dapat dianggap lalai secara perdata atau pidana atas perilaku anak-anak mereka yang masih di bawah umur.

Setiap negara bagian memiliki undang-undangnya sendiri mengenai tanggung jawab keuangan orang tua atas tindakan anak-anak mereka. Orang tua bertanggung jawab atas tindakan berbahaya anak-anak mereka dengan cara yang sama seperti majikan bertanggung jawab atas tindakan berbahaya karyawan mereka. Konsep hukum ini dikenal sebagai kewajiban perwakilan. Orang tua bertanggung jawab secara perwakilan, meskipun tidak secara langsung bertanggung jawab atas cedera tersebut. Sejumlah negara bagian menganggap orang tua bertanggung jawab secara finansial atas kerusakan yang disebabkan oleh anak-anak mereka. Namun, beberapa negara bagian ini membatasi jumlah kewajiban. Misalnya, di California, orang tua secara perdata bertanggung jawab atas "tindakan pelanggaran ringan yang disengaja yang mengakibatkan kematian, cedera pribadi, atau kerusakan properti." Lihat Kal. Sipil Kode 1714.1 (2005). Secara khusus,

Lihat Kal. Sipil Kode 1714.1 (a) (2005).

CONTOH: Andrew, yang berusia 16 tahun, pergi minum-minum dengan beberapa temannya (juga di bawah umur). Saat mabuk, dia mencuri sebuah pesawat kecil dan melakukan perjalanan yang menyenangkan bersama teman-temannya. Dia tidak memiliki lisensi pilot. Meskipun dia berhasil mendaratkan pesawat tanpa insiden, dia meluncur ke pesawat kecil lainnya dan menyebabkan kerusakan senilai $ 10.000. Pemilik pesawat yang rusak itu menggugat Andrew dan orang tuanya. Jika insiden ini terjadi di California, baik Andrew dan orang tuanya dapat dimintai pertanggungjawaban secara bersama-sama atas kerugian sebesar $10.000 sebagai akibat dari kesalahan yang disengaja oleh Andrew. Lihat Kal. Sipil Kode 1714.1 lihat juga Nev. Putaran. Negara. Ann. 41.470 (2005).

Jenis tanggung jawab gugatan lainnya tercakup lebih lengkap dalam kelas gugatan.

Tanggung jawab atas Kejahatan

Di common law, ada juga batasan usia tertentu mengenai tanggung jawab anak di bawah umur untuk tindakan kriminal:

  • Di bawah usia 7 tahun: Anak dinyatakan tidak mampu melakukan tindak pidana.
  • Antara usia 7 dan 14: Adanya anggapan bahwa anak tidak dapat melakukan suatu tindak pidana, namun anggapan tersebut dapat dibantah oleh negara yang membuktikan bahwa anak tersebut memiliki kecerdasan yang cukup untuk membentuk suatu maksud pidana.
  • Antara usia 14 dan 21: Seorang anak di bawah umur dianggap memiliki kapasitas yang sama untuk membentuk niat kriminal sebagai orang dewasa.

Saat ini, sebagian besar negara bagian berurusan dengan pelanggar remaja dengan undang-undang yang berfokus pada pengawasan dan rehabilitasi anak di bawah umur dalam proses perdata. Umumnya, anak di bawah umur tetap berada di bawah yurisdiksi pengadilan anak sampai usia 16 atau 18 tahun, setelah itu mereka menjadi subjek tanggung jawab pidana yang sama seperti orang dewasa. Namun, karena pelaku yang lebih muda melakukan kejahatan dengan kekerasan, sistem peradilan pidana berjuang untuk menangani situasi ini.


Jenis apa tort saya?

halo, kami telah memiliki Reggie selama lebih dari 3 tahun sekarang, kami mendapatkannya dari seorang teman keluarga yang pindah. Kami memilikinya di dalam kandang tetapi dia terus menggaruknya dan selalu membuat dirinya terjebak saat mencoba membukanya! Dia saat ini tinggal di lantai kamar tidur saya, ini sangat kontroversial yang pernah saya lihat tetapi dia tidak memiliki masalah dengan menggigit furnitur, ditendang atau memakan sesuatu yang tidak seharusnya dia lakukan. Beberapa lampiran yang diposting di sini luar biasa! -Tapi aku merasa tidak enak menyimpannya di tempat kecil.

Bisakah Anda memberi saya wawasan tentang dunia kura-kura dan mengidentifikasi jenis kura-kura apa dia? Saya belum pernah melihat yang seperti dia! Juga, dapatkah Anda memberi saya beberapa saran untuk merawatnya dan memastikan dia menjalani hidupnya sepenuhnya? Terima kasih

Anggota Terkenal

Bantal guling222

Anggota baru


maaf jika saya salah memeluknya - saya belum memeriksa plastron sebelumnya - dia pasti perlu mandi

Lembar Perawatan Kura-kura Gurun

Lembar perawatan yang ditautkan @Tom untuk Anda di utas lainnya adalah lembar perawatan terbaru dan akurat untuk kura-kura gurun.

Pelatih Anjing

Untuk orang-orang yang lebih jauh ke pedalaman, di daerah yang lebih kering dan lebih panas, itu dapat dilakukan dengan memuaskan tanpa panas, tetapi bahkan untuk mereka, lebih baik dengan panas.

Jika Anda menghubungi orang tempat Anda mendapatkan kura-kura, atau kebanyakan orang yang memiliki dan memelihara kura-kura dewasa, mereka akan memberi tahu Anda bahwa itu akan baik-baik saja tanpa panas. Kemungkinan besar, kura-kura akan berakhir dengan RI dan akhirnya mati di dekat pantai. Saya dulu bekerja di pantai Hermosa di toko hewan peliharaan, dan kami menyelamatkan beberapa DT yang sakit setiap tahun. Obatnya adalah memindahkan mereka ke pedalaman ke Whittier di rumah teman.

RobinRae

Anggota baru

Untuk orang-orang yang lebih jauh ke pedalaman, di daerah yang lebih kering dan lebih panas, itu dapat dilakukan dengan memuaskan tanpa panas, tetapi bahkan untuk mereka, lebih baik dengan panas.

Jika Anda menghubungi orang tempat Anda mendapatkan kura-kura, atau kebanyakan orang yang memiliki dan memelihara kura-kura dewasa, mereka akan memberi tahu Anda bahwa itu akan baik-baik saja tanpa panas. Kemungkinan besar, kura-kura akan berakhir dengan RI dan akhirnya mati di dekat pantai. Saya dulu bekerja di pantai Hermosa di toko hewan peliharaan, dan kami menyelamatkan beberapa DT yang sakit setiap tahun. Obatnya adalah memindahkan mereka ke pedalaman ke Whittier di rumah teman.


Tort Terbatas Vs. Tort Penuh & Pengecualian # 8211 untuk Tort Terbatas di PA

Di Pennsylvania, perusahaan asuransi menawarkan penuh kue pertanggungan, yang memberikan individu yang dilindungi hak untuk menuntut di pengadilan untuk ganti rugi penuh, dan kesalahan terbatas cakupan yang membatasi kemampuan untuk menuntut rasa sakit dan penderitaan.

Bahkan jika seseorang terluka dalam kecelakaan mobil karena kesalahan terbatas pada polis asuransi mobil Pennsylvania mereka, ada pengecualian untuk kesalahan terbatas yang masih memungkinkan pihak yang terluka untuk menuntut rasa sakit dan penderitaan.

Di bawah Undang-Undang Tanggung Jawab Kendaraan Bermotor Pennsylvania, ada pengecualian di mana pihak yang dirugikan yang memilih gugatan terbatas atau diasuransikan oleh polis gugatan terbatas masih dapat memulihkan penyelesaian rasa sakit dan penderitaan seolah-olah dia memiliki polis gugatan penuh. Pengecualian ini dapat ditemukan di bawah hukum di 75 Pa. Kontra. Negara. 1705 (d), dan termasuk yang berikut ini:

  1. Pengemudi Mabuk Penyebab KecelakaanGugatan terbatas tidak berlaku jika pengemudi yang bersalah atas kecelakaan itu dihukum karena mengemudi di bawah pengaruh (DUI) (DWI) atau menerima Disposisi Rehabilitatif yang Dipercepat atau (Program ARD). Kunci untuk diingat adalah bahwa orang tersebut harus dihukum karena DUI atau menerima ARD (sering disebut “program pelanggar pertama kali).
  2. Pengemudi yang Tidak Diasuransikan Menyebabkan Kecelakaan. Di bawah hukum Pennsylvania, jika pengemudi yang menyebabkan kecelakaan itu tidak diasuransikan, pihak yang dirugikan tidak terikat oleh gugatan terbatas. Undang-undang tersebut berbunyi bahwa gugatan terbatas tidak berlaku "kapan pun orang yang bersalah tidak mempertahankan tanggung jawab keuangan seperti yang dipersyaratkan" oleh undang-undang Pennsylvania. 75 Pa. Kontra. Negara. 1705 (d) (1) (iv). Ini berarti bahwa jika korban yang terluka dalam kecelakaan mobil memiliki pertanggungan pengendara yang tidak diasuransikan atau asuransi UM, klaim dapat diajukan terhadap perusahaan asuransi Anda sendiri dan Anda tidak akan terikat oleh opsi gugatan terbatas bahkan jika Anda memilih kesalahan terbatas di bawah mobil Anda sendiri. aturan.
  3. Mobil Terdaftar di Negara Bagian Lain. Jika orang yang menyebabkan kecelakaan itu mengemudikan kendaraan yang terdaftar di negara bagian di luar Pennsylvania, gugatan terbatas tidak berlaku. Karena banyak kecelakaan mobil di wilayah Philadelphia sering disebabkan oleh pengemudi dengan mobil yang terdaftar di New Jersey, New York, Maryland atau Delaware, ini merupakan pengecualian yang signifikan. Ingat, bukan dari mana pengemudi itu mengontrol, melainkan di mana mobil itu terdaftar. 75 Pa. Kontra. Negara. 1705 (d) (1) (i).
  4. Penumpang diKendaraan Komersial atau Sepeda Motor. Jika pihak yang dirugikan adalah penumpang taksi, bus, Uber, Lyft, kendaraan sewaan, sepeda motor, atau jenis kendaraan lainnya yang bukan merupakan “kendaraan penumpang pribadi”, pihak yang dirugikan berhak atas pertanggungan gugatan penuh meskipun mereka memilih wanprestasi terbatas atas kebijakan mereka sendiri. Kendaraan penumpang pribadi tidak termasuk kendaraan yang disewakan kepada orang lain (sewa truk atau mobil sewaan), digunakan oleh umum (seperti Uber, Lyft atau taksi), atau yang pada prinsipnya digunakan untuk tujuan komersial (truk trailer traktor, bus, mobil umum). 75 Pa. Kontra. Negara. 1705 (d) (3). Yang dimaksud dengan kendaraan penumpang pribadi adalah kendaraan beroda empat, sehingga memungkinkan pengendara/penumpang sepeda motor memperoleh pengecualian atas perbuatan melawan hukum yang terbatas.
  5. Pejalan kaki atau pengendara sepeda. Seorang pejalan kaki atau pengendara sepeda yang terluka oleh mobil tidak terikat oleh kesalahan terbatas, terlepas dari apa yang mereka pilih untuk kebijakan mobil mereka sendiri. Jadi, jika Anda atau orang yang Anda cintai sedang menyeberang jalan atau mengendarai sepeda dan ditabrak mobil, tidak masalah jika Anda memilih tort terbatas pada kebijakan mobil Anda sendiri.
  6. Cedera itu termasuk "Cedera Serius" menurut hukum. Undang-undang menyatakan, bahwa "kecuali cedera yang diderita adalah cedera serius, setiap orang yang terikat oleh pemilihan gugatan terbatas harus dilarang mempertahankan tindakan untuk kerugian nonekonomi [rasa sakit dan penderitaan]." Jadi apa yang dimaksud dengan cedera serius? Legislatif Pennsylvania telah mendefinisikan cedera serius sebagai "cedera yang mengakibatkan kematian, gangguan serius pada fungsi tubuh, atau cacat permanen." 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1702. Namun, pengadilan Pennsylvania telah menyatakan bahwa semua cedera berbeda dan bahkan cedera jaringan lunak dapat merupakan "cedera serius" di mana didokumentasikan dengan jelas dan secara substansial merusak fungsi tubuh.

Dalam menentukan apakah kerugian yang diklaim adalah “serius”, Pengadilan harus mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor berikut: (1) tingkat penurunan (2) fungsi tubuh tertentu terganggu (3) lamanya waktu penurunan tersebut berlangsung (4) jenis perawatan yang diperlukan untuk memperbaiki kerusakan dan (5) faktor lain yang relevan. Pengadilan Pennsylvania telah menyatakan bahwa fokusnya bukan hanya pada jenis cedera, tetapi lebih pada bagaimana cedera memengaruhi fungsi tubuh tertentu. Biasanya, kesaksian medis akan diperlukan untuk membuktikan cedera serius.

Beberapa contoh kasus di mana Pengadilan menyatakan cedera itu bisa "serius" dan terserah kepada juri untuk menentukan masalah apakah cedera itu serius termasuk:

  • Penggugat terus mengalami nyeri di leher, punggung, kaki, disertai sakit kepala, tidak bisa duduk atau berdiri dalam waktu lama, dan merindukan aktivitas anak-anaknya. Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636 (Pa. Super. 2013)
  • Penggugat menderita herniated disc dan menjalani terapi fisik serta mengalami gangguan pada kemampuannya untuk tidur, berlari dan mendaki jarak jauh, bermain dengan anaknya, mengendarai sepeda gunung dan sepeda motor meskipun ia hanya absen 3 hari kerja. Kelly v. Ziolko, 734 A.2d 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)
  • Penggugat menderita disc menonjol, nyeri menjalar ke kakinya, mengalami kesulitan mengangkat benda berat dan bermain dengan putrinya, dan terus mengalami nyeri selama lebih dari satu tahun. Furman v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. 1998).
  • Penggugat menderita sindrom nyeri kronis tidak dapat melakukan banyak aktivitas fisik termasuk pekerjaan rumah tangga dan rekreasi tanpa rasa sakit dan mengalami kesulitan tidur.Robinson v. Upole, 750 A.2d 339 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Firma hukum kecelakaan mobil berpengalaman seperti The Pearce Law Firm tahu bagaimana membuktikan cedera Anda "serius" untuk memenuhi ambang batas untuk mengatasi kesalahan terbatas. Kami akan memastikan Anda menjalani tes diagnostik seperti MRI atau x-ray untuk melihat apakah ada fraktur atau herniasi diskus.

Juga, jika Anda mengalami jaringan parut, kami akan mendokumentasikannya dengan dokter medis Anda. Selain itu, kami akan meminta Anda membuat jurnal tentang bagaimana cedera Anda memengaruhi hidup Anda seperti tidak mengizinkan Anda bermain dengan anak Anda atau berpartisipasi dalam kegiatan sosial. Jika Anda kesakitan dan mengalami gejala, penting untuk tetap membawa dokumen ini ke perusahaan asuransi. Kami juga akan menunjukkan kepada perusahaan asuransi bagaimana cedera telah mempengaruhi pekerjaan Anda, baik menunjukkan bahwa Anda telah melewatkan banyak waktu dari pekerjaan atau bahwa Anda memiliki batasan dan tidak dapat melakukan pekerjaan Anda sepenuhnya seperti dulu.

  1. Pengecualian lain untuk gugatan terbatas. Pengecualian lain yang kurang umum digunakan untuk mengatasi kesalahan terbatas termasuk kecelakaan yang disebabkan oleh cacat dalam desain, manufaktur, perbaikan atau pemeliharaan kendaraan. Terakhir, pengecualian ada jika orang yang menyebabkan kecelakaan itu bermaksud melukai dirinya sendiri atau orang lain.

Firma Hukum Pearce Siap Membantu. Memiliki pengacara gugatan terbatas yang berpengalaman penting dalam mengevaluasi kasus Anda. Edith Pearce bekerja selama bertahun-tahun sebagai pengacara untuk sebuah perusahaan asuransi mobil. Dia tahu bagaimana mengatasi pembelaan gugatan terbatas jika fakta kasus Anda memenuhi salah satu pengecualian. Dia akan meninjau secara menyeluruh kasus kecelakaan mobil Anda dan dokumen asuransi Anda. Hubungi perusahaan kami. Kami menawarkan konsultasi gratis - jadi jangan pertaruhkan kasus Anda kepada sembarang orang.

Lihat apa yang Kaitlin katakan tentang kami di Google:

Akan merekomendasikan firma hukum ini kepada siapa pun! Edith, William, dan Nicole melakukan segala yang mereka bisa untuk klien mereka dan membantu mereka menerima keadilan yang layak mereka dapatkan. Anda akan berada di tangan yang hebat dengan perusahaan ini!


Lima Aturan IRS Utama Tentang Bagaimana Penyelesaian Gugatan Dikenakan Pajak

Banyak penggugat memenangkan atau menyelesaikan gugatan dan terkejut bahwa mereka harus membayar pajak. Beberapa tidak menyadarinya sampai waktu pajak tahun berikutnya ketika Formulir IRS 1099 tiba melalui pos. Sedikit perencanaan pajak, terutama sebelum Anda menyelesaikannya, akan sangat membantu. Ini bahkan lebih penting sekarang dengan pajak yang lebih tinggi pada penyelesaian gugatan di bawah undang-undang reformasi pajak yang baru saja disahkan. Banyak penggugat dikenakan pajak atas biaya pengacara mereka juga, bahkan jika pengacara mereka mengambil 40% dari atas. In a $100,000 case, that means paying tax on $100,000, even if $40,000 goes to the lawyer. The new law generally does not impact physical injury cases with no punitive damages. It also should not impact plaintiffs suing their employers, although there are new wrinkles in sexual harassment cases. Here are five rules to know.

1. Taxes depend on the “origin of the claim.” Taxes are based on the origin of your claim. If you get laid off at work and sue seeking wages, you’ll be taxed as wages, and probably some pay on a Form 1099 for emotional distress. But if you sue for damage to your condo by a negligent building contractor, your damages may not be income. You may be able to treat the recovery as a reduction in your purchase price of the condo. The rules are full of exceptions and nuances, so be careful, how settlement awards are taxed, especially post-tax reform.

2. Recoveries for physical injuries and physical sickness are tax-free, but symptoms of emotional distress are not physical. If you sue for physical injuries, damages are tax-free. Before 1996, all “personal” damages were tax-free, so emotional distress and defamation produced tax-free recoveries. But since 1996, your injury must be “physical.” If you sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress, your recovery is taxed. Physical symptoms of emotional distress (like headaches and stomachaches) is taxed, but physical injuries or sickness is not. The rules can make some tax cases chicken or egg, with many judgment calls. If in an employment dispute you receive $50,000 extra because your employer gave you an ulcer, is an ulcer physical, or merely a symptom of emotional distress? Many plaintiffs take aggressive positions on their tax returns, but that can be a losing battle if the defendant issues an IRS Form 1099 for the entire settlement. Haggling over tax details before you sign and settle is best.

3. Allocating damages can save taxes . Most legal disputes involve multiple issues. You might claim that the defendant kept your laptop, frittered away your trust fund, underpaid you, failed to reimburse you for a business trip, or other items. Even if your dispute relates to one course of conduct, there’s a good chance the total settlement involves several types of consideration. It is best for plaintiff and defendant to agree on tax treatment. Such agreements aren’t binding on the IRS or the courts in later tax disputes, but they are usually not ignored by the IRS.

4. Attorney fees are a tax trap. If you are the plaintiff and use a contingent fee lawyer, you’ll usually be treated (for tax purposes) as receiving 100% of the money recovered by you and your attorney, even if the defendant pays your lawyer directly his contingent fee cut. If your case is fully nontaxable (say an auto accident in which you’re injured), that shouldn't cause any tax problems. But if your recovery is taxable, watch out. Say you settle a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against your neighbor for $100,000, and your lawyer keeps $40,000. You might think you’d have $60,000 of income. Instead, you’ll have $100,000 of income. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Banks, that plaintiffs generally have income equal to 100% of their recoveries. even if their lawyers take a share.

How about deducting the legal fees? In 2004, Congress enacted an above the line deduction for legal fees in employment claims and certain whistleblower claims. That deduction still remains, but outside these two areas, there's big trouble. in the big tax bill passed at the end of 2017, there's a new tax on litigation settlements, no deduction for legal fees. No tax deduction for legal fees comes as a bizarre and unpleasant surprise. Tax advice early, before the case settles and the settlement agreement is signed, is essential.

5. Punitive damages and interest are always taxable. If you are injured in a car crash and get $50,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages, the former is tax-free. The $5 million is fully taxable, and you can have trouble deducting your attorney fees! The same occurs with interest. You might receive a tax-free settlement or judgment, but pre-judgment or post-judgment interest is always taxable (and can produce attorney fee problems). That can make it attractive to settle your case rather than have it go to judgment. For a crazy example how these tax rules can whittle after-tax amounts to nothing, check out how IRS taxes kill plaintiff's $289M Monsanto weedkiller verdict.


Contents

At the time of the 1928 New York Court of Appeals decision in Palsgraf, that state's case law followed a classical formation for negligence: the plaintiff had to show that the Long Island Railroad [a] ("LIRR" or "the railroad") had a duty of care, and that she was injured through a breach of that duty. It was not required that she show that the duty owed was to her. [1] Under New York precedent, the usual duty of utmost care that the railroad as a common carrier owed its customers did not apply to platforms and other parts of the station. [1]

Facts Edit

Sunday, August 24, 1924, was a warm summer day in Brooklyn, and Helen Palsgraf, a 40-year-old janitor and housekeeper, was taking her two daughters, Elizabeth and Lillian, aged 15 and 12, to Rockaway Beach. Having paid the necessary fare, they were on the platform at the East New York station of the LIRR on Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, when a train, not theirs, pulled in. As it began to move again, two men raced for the train, and one made it without incident, as the doors had not closed. The other, a man carrying a package, leapt aboard, with the help of a platform guard pushing him from behind as a member of the train's crew pulled him into the car. But in the process, the man lost the package, which dropped and exploded, for it apparently contained fireworks. Either the force of the explosion or the panicking of those on the platform caused a tall, coin-operated scale to topple onto Helen Palsgraf. No one was hurt enough to spend the night in the hospital, though several people, Palsgraf among them, were listed as injured. [2] [3]

Contemporary accounts and witnesses at trial described the man as Italian in appearance, and there was speculation that the package was being taken for use at an Italian-American celebration of some sort no great effort was made to identify the owner. Palsgraf's injury was listed in The New York Times as shock she also suffered bruising. The distance between Helen Palsgraf and the explosion was never made clear in the trial transcript, or in the opinions of the judges who ruled on the case, but the distance from the explosion to the scale was described in the Times as "more than ten feet away" (3 metres). [2] [3] Several days after the incident, she developed a bad stammer, and her doctor testified at trial that it was due to the trauma of the events at East New York station. She had not recovered from the stammer when the case came to court. [4]

Trial Edit

Palsgraf brought suit against the railroad in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, a trial-level court, in Brooklyn on October 2, 1924. The summons was served the following month, and the defendant filed its answer on December 3. The case was heard on May 24 and 25, 1927, with Justice Burt Jay Humphrey presiding. [5] Humphrey had served for over twenty years on the county court in Queens before unexpectedly being nominated for election to the Supreme Court in 1925 he was noted for his courteous and friendly manner. [6] Manhattan lawyers tried the Brooklyn case: Matthew W. Wood, who worked from 233 Broadway (the Woolworth Building) represented Palsgraf, while Joseph F. Keany, whose office was at Pennsylvania Station, was for the railroad, along with William McNamara. [5] Wood was an experienced solo practitioner with two degrees from Ivy League schools Keany had headed the LIRR's legal department for twenty years—McNamara, who tried the case, was one of the department's junior lawyers, who had advanced from clerk to counsel after graduation from law school. [7] At trial, Palsgraf testified that she had been hit in the side by the scale, and had been treated at the scene, and then took a taxicab home. She testified to trembling then for several days, and then the stammering started. Her health forced her to give up her work in mid-1926. [8] Wood called Herbert Gerhardt, an engraver, who had seen the man with the package hurry towards the train, and whose wife had been hit in the stomach in the man's rush. He testified that the scale had been "blown right to pieces". [9]

On the second day of the trial, Wood called Dr. Karl A. Parshall, Palsgraf's physician. He testified that he had treated Palsgraf occasionally for minor ailments before the incident at East New York, but on the day after found her shaken and bruised. He gave it as his opinion that Palsgraf's ills were caused by the accident. [10] Grace Gerhardt, Herbert's wife, was the next witness. She testified to being hit by one of "the two young Italian fellows" who were racing to make the train, and how one made it unaided and the other only with the help of two LIRR employees. She had nothing to say about the scale or Palsgraf, having seen neither. [11] Elizabeth and Lillian Palsgraf, the elder and younger daughter of the plaintiff, were next to testify and spoke of what they had seen. Wood indicated his only remaining witness was a neurologist, an expert witness, and McNamara for the LIRR moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Palsgraf had failed to present evidence of negligence, but Justice Humphrey denied it. The neurologist, Graeme M. Hammond of Manhattan, had examined Palsgraf two days before, observing her stammering, speaking only with difficulty. She told him of depression and headaches. He diagnosed her with traumatic hysteria, for which the explosion was a plausible cause, and said the hysteria was likely to continue as long as the litigation did, for only once it was resolved were the worries connected with it likely to vanish. [12]

Wood rested his case on behalf of the plaintiff McNamara offered no evidence but again moved to dismiss, which Humphrey denied. The judge told the all-male jury that if the LIRR employees "omitted to do the things which prudent and careful trainmen do for the safety of those who are boarding their trains, as well as the safety of those who are standing upon the platform waiting for other trains, and that the failure resulted in the plaintiff's injury, then the defendant would be liable." [13] The jury was out for two hours and 35 minutes, including the lunch hour, and they awarded Palsgraf $6,000 ($89,400 today). [14] Pursuant to statute, she also recovered costs of $142, an amount added to the verdict. [15] A motion for a new trial was denied on May 27, 1927 by Justice Humphrey, who did not issue a written opinion, and a judgment was entered on the verdict on May 31, from which the LIRR appealed on June 14. [16] Once Palsgraf had gotten her jury verdict, the Gerhardts also sued the railroad, with Wood as their counsel. [17]

William H. Manz, in his article on the facts in Palsgraf, suggested that neither side spent much time preparing for trial. Wood did not contact his fact witnesses, the Gerhardts, until shortly before the trial, and Palsgraf was examined by Dr. Hammond the day before the trial started. McNamara, one of the most junior members of the LIRR's legal team, called no witnesses, and Manz suggested the entire defense strategy was to get the judge to dismiss the case. [18] In his later book, Judge Richard Posner indicated that the much-sued LIRR did not present a better case than the first-time plaintiff: "it put on a bargain-basement defense".

Initial appeal Edit

The LIRR's appeal took the case to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, for the Second Department, [19] the state's intermediate appeals court. In its briefs before the Appellate Division, the LIRR argued that the verdict had been contrary to the law and the evidence. It stressed that it had no foreknowledge that the package was dangerous, and that no law required it to search the contents of passenger luggage. The brief stated that given this, there was no negligence in helping a man make a train, and even if there was, that negligence was not the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. [20] Wood, for Palsgraf, argued that the jury verdict finding negligence was supported by undisputed facts, and should not be questioned by the appellate courts. The plaintiff's brief also suggested that the failure of the railroad to call as witnesses the employees who had aided the man should decide any inferences of negligence against it. Wood deemed the trainmen guilty of a "dereliction of duty", misconduct that was the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries. [21]

The lawyers argued the case before the Appellate Division in Brooklyn on October 21, 1927. [15] On December 9, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment, 3–2. Albert H. F. Seeger wrote the majority opinion for the five justices hearing the case, and was joined by Justices William F. Hagarty and William B. Carswell. [19] Seeger had been born in Stuttgart and came to the United States as a child he had been elected to the Supreme Court in 1917 and was elevated to the Appellate Division by Governor Al Smith in 1926. Aged 68 at the time of Palsgraf, he could serve only two more years before mandatory retirement. [22] Justice Seeger ruled that the finding of negligence by the jury was supported by the evidence, and speculated that the jury might have found that helping a passenger board a moving train was a negligent act. He wrote that while the set of facts might be novel, the case was no different in principle from well-known court decisions on causation, such as the Squib case, in which an explosive (a squib) was lit and thrown, then was hurled away repeatedly by people not wanting to be hurt until it exploded near the plaintiff, injuring him his suit against the man who had set the squib in motion was upheld. The majority also focused on the high degree of duty of care that the LIRR owed to Palsgraf, one of its customers. [23]

Presiding Justice Edward Lazansky (joined by Justice J. Addison Young) wrote a dissent. [19] Lazansky, the son of Czech immigrants, had been elected New York Secretary of State as a Democrat in 1910. Elected to the Supreme Court in 1917, he had been designated presiding justice of the Second Department by Governor Smith earlier in 1927. [22] Lazansky did not question the jury finding of negligence, but felt that the employees' conduct was not the proximate cause of Palsgraf's injuries, since the man's conduct in bringing a package that might explode to a crowded passenger station was an independent act of negligence, rendering the neglect by the railroad too remote in causation for there to be liability. [24]

The LIRR was entitled by law to take the case to the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court) as there had been a dissent in the Appellate Division, and it did. [25] The railroad argued again that Palsgraf had failed to establish that she had come to harm through the railroad's negligence: that there was no negligence, and even if there was, that neglect had not harmed Palsgraf, since such injury was not "a natural and probable consequence of assisting a man to board a train". [20] Its brief alleged that the trainmen could not have stopped the man from boarding, and once he had flung himself onto the train, had little choice but to help him, "faced with such an emergency they cannot be charged with negligence because they elected to assist the man rather than stand idly by and leave him to his fate." [26] Wood, for his part, argued that negligence had been found by the jury, and by both majority and dissenting justices in the Appellate Division. He wrote that there were many facts from which the jury could have found negligence, including the fact that the train had not shut its doors as it departed (though whether this was to allow latecomers to board or because it was a summer day is uncertain). [27] The case was argued before the Court of Appeals in Albany on February 24, 1928. [28]

Cardozo's majority opinion Edit

Cardozo's statement of facts, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. at 340–341

The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Benjamin N. Cardozo, was a judge who was greatly respected he later became a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. After a standout legal career, Cardozo had been elected to the trial-level Supreme Court in 1913, but was quickly designated by the governor for service on the Court of Appeals. He was in 1917 appointed a judge of that court, and in 1926 was elected chief judge by the voters. [29] In Palsgraf, Cardozo wrote for a 4–3 majority of the Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate judgment and directing that the case be decided for the defendant, the LIRR. [30] Cardozo was joined by Judges Cuthbert W. Pound, Irving Lehman and Henry Kellogg. [31]

Despite being the longest statement of the facts in any of the four appellate opinions generated by the case, [32] Cardozo's was described by Posner as "elliptical and slanted". [33] It has also been deemed "highly abstract". [32] According to Professor Walter O. Weyrauch in his 1978 journal article, "Cardozo's famous opinion reduced the complicated facts of the case to a bare minimum. Mrs. Palsgraf was transformed into a 'plaintiff' without age, family status, or occupation. The opinion omitted the nature of her injury, the amount of damages that she sought, and the size of the jury award." [34] For example, Cardozo describes Palsgraf (whom he does not name, nor mention her daughters) as standing on the LIRR's platform, rather than waiting for a train, thus downplaying her status as a customer entitled to a high degree of care by the railroad. The explosive package is described as small, though the witnesses had described it as large. The scales are described as being "at the other end of the platform, many feet away" from the explosion, but the record does not support this statement. [35] This characterization may have been based on testimony by Lillian Palsgraf, who had gone to buy a paper from a newsstand "at the other end of the platform", but who was yet close enough to see the package fall. Cardozo's characterization of distance would be challenged by the plaintiff in her motion for reargument, which would be denied with the rejoinder that however close she was to the explosion, she was not so close as to bring her within the zone of foreseeable risk. [36]

After the fact pattern, Cardozo began his discussion of the law with "the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relative to her it was not negligence at all." [37] Cardozo quoted Pollock on Torts and cited several cases for the proposition that "proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." [37] Only if there is a duty to the injured plaintiff, the breach of which causes injury, can there be liability. [38] He defended his decision, "a different conclusion will involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of contradictions." [37] Cardozo posed hypothetical situations: if a railway guard stumbles over a bundle of newspapers, and there are explosives within, will there be liability to an injured passenger at the other end of the platform? Will the result be different if the object containing the explosives is a valise instead? If there was negligence that day, Cardozo argued, it was only negligence that resulted in the fall and destruction of the package, and there was no wrong done by the railroad to Palsgraf for personal injury, "the diversity of incidents emphasizes the futility of the effort to build the plaintiff's right upon the basis of a wrong to some one else." [39] The chief judge instructed, "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed". [40] Cardozo did not absolve the defendant who knowingly unleashes a destructive force, such as by shooting a gun, just because the bullet takes an unexpected path. This is not such a case, Cardozo held: even if the railway guard had thrown down the package intentionally, without knowing the contents he could not knowingly risk harm to Palsgraf, and would not be liable. Negligence cannot impose liability where an intentional act would not. [41]

Negligence, Cardozo emphasized, derives from human relations, not in the abstract. Negligence that does no one harm is not a tort. It is not enough, he found, to prove negligence by the defendant and damage to the plaintiff there must be a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. He traced the history of the law of negligence, a concept not known in medieval times, and noted that it evolved as an offshoot of the law of trespass, and one could not sue for trespass to another. Had the railroad been negligent towards Palsgraf, it might have been liable, but "the consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong", and there was no legal wrong done by the railroad to Palsgraf. [42] Thus, the lower courts were incorrect, and must be reversed, and the case dismissed, with Palsgraf to bear the costs of suit. [43]

Dissent by Andrews Edit

William S. Andrews of Syracuse was a 69-year-old [44] judge, noted for his scholarship, who had been on the Court of Appeals since 1917. The son of Charles Andrews, a former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, William Andrews is best remembered today because he wrote an opinion in Palsgraf. [45] In that dissent, he was joined by Judges Frederick E. Crane and John F. O'Brien. Andrews began with a brief recitation of facts: that a railroad employee had negligently dislodged the package, the contents of which the trainman was unaware, and the subsequent explosion broke the scale and injured the plaintiff, "an intending passenger". [46] Andrews noted the fundamental difference among the judges concerning the law of negligence: whether there must be a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which injured her, and whether, when there is an act that is a threat to the safety of others, the doer of it should be "liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger". [46] Andrews believed that if there was a negligent act, the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, that should establish liability. [47]

Andrews found Cardozo's reasoning too narrow, and felt that the focus should be on the unreasonable act: driving down Broadway at high speed is negligent whether or not an accident occurs. Such an act is wrong to the public at large, not only to those who might be injured. "Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone . In an empty world, negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those whom he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms him a mile away as surely as it does those on the scene." [48]

Andrews pointed out that the law allows plaintiffs to recover from defendants who had no duty towards them: orphans may recover for their negligently killed parents a bereaved person may recover for negligence in the death of a spouse. An insurance company may sue in subrogation and recover the sum paid out from the person who started the fire. "Behind the cloud of words is the fact they hide, that the act, wrongful as to the insured, has also harmed the company." [49]

An event may have many causes, Andrews noted, and only some may be deemed proximate. Liability for negligence may only be found where that proximate cause exists, a term that the judge admitted was inexact. He suggested the analogy of a river, made up of water from many sources, and by the time it wound to sea, fully intermixed. But for a time, after water from a muddy swamp or a clayey bed joins, its origin may be traced. Beyond a certain point, it cannot be traced, and such is proximate cause, "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." [50]

That point, beyond which there is no proximate cause, is drawn differently by different judges, and by different courts, Andrews explained. He listed factors that courts might consider, such as remoteness in time or space, and discussed some hypotheticals, such as a chauffeur who causes an accident, the noise of which startles a nursemaid into dropping a child, then returned to the case being decided,

Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently twenty-five or thirty feet. Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the appellant in his brief "it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." So it was a substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous sequence—direct connection. The only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as here it needed no great foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by flying fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury in some form was most probable. [51]

Given that, Andrews concluded, the jury verdict should be upheld. "Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence. That is all we have before us." [51]

Wood, Palsgraf's lawyer, moved the Court of Appeals to allow reargument of the case, alleging that Cardozo had confused the position of Palsgraf with that of her daughter Lillian (at the newsstand), and complained about the chief judge's use of such terms as "distant" and "far away". Wood warned that the decision could have far-reaching adverse effects on innocent passengers. [52] The court denied the motion with a one-sentence statement likely written by Cardozo, "If we assume that the plaintiff was nearer the scene of the explosion than the prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not so near that injury from a falling package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range of reasonable prevision." [36] Costs of $559.60 were due from Palsgraf to the railroad under Cardozo's order. [53] Posner doubted the sum was ever collected, noting that Palsgraf's family spoke to legal scholars and periodicals about the case in later years, and never mentioned an attempt to collect what would have been about a year's salary for the disabled former janitor. [54]

Helen Palsgraf remained embittered about the loss of her case. She became mute, and suffered from other health problems prior to her death on October 27, 1945, at the age of 61. At the time of her death, Palsgraf was living in Richmond Hill, Queens with her daughter Elizabeth. Her former attorney, Wood, maintained a law office in the Woolworth Building until his death in 1972 at age 96. His opposing trial counsel, McNamara, remained with the LIRR's legal department until his retirement in 1959, while McNamara's superior and counsel of record, Keany, continued as the railroad's general solicitor until he died in 1935. Justice Humphrey retired in 1936, a year after he gained notoriety for presiding over the marriage of heiress Doris Duke he died in 1940. [55] Andrews retired at the end of 1928, having reached the mandatory retirement age of 70 he died in 1936. [56] Cardozo was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover and served there until his death in 1938. [29]

After the Palsgraf case became prominent among lawyers, having been taught to many of them in law school, members of the family sometimes encountered startled reactions when lawyers learned their last name. Frank Palsgraf, Helen's grandson, told in 1978 of "being treated like a celebrity" by a prosecutor when called for jury duty, and causing the judge to reminisce about hard nights studying the case in law school. Nevertheless, the prosecutor struck him from the jury. [57] According to Posner, the later coverage of the family "makes it clear that, with the exception of Mrs. Palsgraf, the Palsgraf family was thrilled by its association with a famous case, notwithstanding the outcome". [58] In 1991, that association became closer, as Lisa Newell, first cousin four times removed of Judge Cardozo, married Palsgraf's great-grandson, J. Scott Garvey. [59]

Palsgraf came to the attention of the legal world quickly. William L. Prosser of the University of California Law School wrote that the Appellate Division's decision fell into the hands of Francis H. Bohlen of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Bohlen was at that time the reporter compiling the first Restatement of Torts for the American Law Institute (ALI), and Cardozo was informally one of the advisers. In that task, Bohlen was having difficulty dealing with the concept of duty of care in negligence, especially involving unforeseeable plaintiffs, and Prosser related that Cardozo was treated to a learned discussion by the other advisers of a case that might come before his court and, convinced by the arguments, used them to decide Palsgraf. [60] Kaufman doubted this story, which was told to Prosser by Dean Young B. Smith of Columbia, noting that the only meeting of the advisers between the two appeal decisions in Palsgraf took place in New York on December 12–13, 1927, beginning only three days after the Appellate Division ruled, and the notes reveal that Cardozo was absent the chief judge was hearing arguments all that week in Albany. Nevertheless, the discussions and materials from the Restatement compilation likely influenced Cardozo in his decision. [61]

Bohlen dwelt heavily upon Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf in presenting the Tentative Draft of the Restatement to the ALI's annual meeting, which approved the section citing Palsgraf with little discussion. [62] [b] Palsgraf quickly became well known in the legal community, and was cited in many cases, some of dubious relevance. According to Kaufman, "the bizarre facts, Cardozo's spin on the legal issue, the case's timing in relation to the Restatement project, its adaptability for law-school teaching, the policy-oriented dissent by Andrews, Cardozo's rhetoric, and Cardozo's name—all these factors combined to make Palsgraf a legal landmark." [59] According to Prosser, writing in his hornbook for law students, "what the Palsgraf case actually did was submit to the nation's most excellent state court a law professor's dream of an examination question". [63] But Professor (later Judge) John T. Noonan saw more than this, noting that Cardozo was then the nation's most prominent state-court judge: "The excitement of Palsgraf was not merely that it was a brilliant examination question it was an examination question answered by Cardozo." [63]

The first mentions of Palsgraf in law reviews were case notes written by law students, appearing over the course of the year following the decision by the Court of Appeals. Professor Robert L. Goodhart, in the Yale Law Journal in 1930, was at the front of an avalanche of commentary to such an extent that by 1938, Louisiana State University professor Thomas A. Cowan deemed Palsgraf "a legal institution". [64] The case entered the standard legal casebooks, from which law students learn, in the early 1930s, usually to illustrate the necessary connection between defendant's misconduct and plaintiff's injury in negligence cases. [65] According to Posner, writing in 1990, "Palsgraf is now the subject of a large scholarly literature, and is, I believe, the only case reprinted in all American casebooks on tort law." [66] Manz wrote, "everyone who has sat in an American law school torts class can recall the basic facts—the crowded railroad platform, the running men, the dropped package, the explosion, and the falling scale. Palsgraf has become a sort of legal 'urban legend'—an allegedly true, but improbable, tale told and retold to each new class of law students." [67] Professor W. Jonathan Cardi noted, "in law school classrooms, 'Palsgraf Day' is often celebrated with food and drink, dramatic reenactments, interpretive poems, and even mock duels between Judges Cardozo and Andrews". [68]

Palsgraf was soon adopted by some state courts, at times in different contexts: Though some state courts outside New York approved it, others did not, sometimes feeling that foreseeability was an issue for the jury to consider. [69] According to Posner, writing in 1990, Cardozo's holding that there is no liability to a plaintiff who could not have been foreseen "has been followed by a number of states besides New York, but it remains the minority rule. Most states continue to muddle along with the nebulous 'proximate cause' approach, which emphasizes the proximity in time and space of the defendant's careless act to the plaintiff's injury that was the approach taken by Judge Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf." [70]

The overwhelming majority of state courts accept that there must be a duty of care for there to be liability: the courts of Wisconsin, though, have stated that they have adopted Andrews' approach, and impose liability when there was a duty to any person, whether or not that person is the plaintiff. [71] The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) amended the earlier formulation only slightly, but the third Restatement (2009), takes an approach closer to that of Andrews in focusing on whether the defendant engaged in an activity that carried a risk of harm to another (not necessarily the plaintiff), and on whether the defendant exercised reasonable care. The new formulation makes foreseeability, or the scope of the risk, not a hurdle that must be overcome, as in Palsgraf, but a factor to be weighed with others when determining whether there was negligence. [72] [73] Thus, according to law professor David Owen in his 2009 article, "the Restatement (Third) discards Judge Cardozo's elemental work in Palsgraf so long ago. And . also rejects Judge Andrew's [sic] valuable insight that juries should be offered a wide range of fairness factors, beginning with foreseeability, in figuring how far responsibility should extend". [74]

According to Posner, "Cardozo's 'bottom line' is that there is no liability to an unforeseeable plaintiff". [70] Don Herzog, in his 2017 book, deemed the Palsgraf principle to mean that "if anyone was wronged here, it was the man with the parcel. The guards' wronging him happened to harm Mrs. Palsgraf. But that doesn't mean they wronged Mrs. Palsgraf. And if they didn't wrong her, she can't conceivably prevail in a tort action. Cardozo is not thinking that if he were on the jury, he wouldn't find the railroad liable. He is saying it was a legal error to let the jury finding stand." [75] This is because "the crucial fact for Cardozo is that the parcel of explosives was unmarked. So reasonably careful conductors worry only that if they make it fall, it will break . They have no reason to worry about the welfare of Mrs. Palsgraf." [76]

Cardozo has been praised for his style of writing in Palsgraf. Posner noted that in the facts of the case Cardozo "saw instantiated the basic principles of negligence law and was able to articulate them in prose of striking freshness, clarity, and vividness", in an opinion mostly written in short sentences and lacking footnotes or block quotes. [77] University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor Kim Lane Scheppele noted that the opinion was "written by Judge Benjamin Cardozo at the height of his formidable powers". [78] Richard Polenberg, in his study of that jurist, stated, "Cardozo had a genius for making it seem that the results he reached were logical, inevitable, and legally unassailable". [79] Prosser stated, "with due respect to the superlative style in which both [Cardozo's and Andrews' opinions] are written, neither of them wears well on long acquaintance. Both of them beg the question shamelessly, stating dogmatic propositions without reason or explanation." [80] Herzog was also less enthusiastic, noting that "the majority opinion is unfortunately written in the curious idiolect I sometimes call Cardozo-speak." [76]

From its early days, there has been criticism of Palsgraf, and more recently, of Cardozo for authoring it. Cowan, writing in 1938, described its holding as limited to its facts, that given the identical circumstances recurring, the railroad would breach no duty to the new plaintiff by assisting a man with such a package in boarding. [81] Prosser in his 1953 article wondered "how can any rule as to the 'scope of the risk' evolved from two guards, a package of fireworks and a scale aid in the slightest degree in the solution of this question? Is it proper, in Palsgraf itself, so utterly to ignore the fact that the plaintiff was a passenger[?] . until the question is decided, is Palsgraf really definite authority even for Palsgraf ?" [82]

Noonan's 1976 book chronicled the unwillingness by legal scholars to utilize the "multitude of legal facts not mentioned by Cardozo and Andrews", even though the lower-court record in Palsgraf was reproduced in a civil procedure casebook in the 1950s. [83] Noonan criticized Cardozo for not taking Palsgraf's circumstances into account when making his decision, and listed factors that may have influenced Cardozo against the plaintiff, including that he was a lifelong bachelor who did not have Palsgraf's experience of caring for children, and he may have frowned upon Wood's representation of Palsgraf (likely on a contingent fee, something not favored at the time). [84] Posner, writing in 1990, disagreed with Noonan and with feminist critics following him, noting that judges take an oath to do equal justice to rich and poor, "so the fact that Mrs. Palsgraf was poor would not have been a principled ground for bending the rules in her favor". [85] Noonan had considered unjust the award of court costs against Palsgraf, and in her 2016 book, law professor Cathleen Kaveny agreed, "the penalty imposed on Palsgraf for seeking justice through the courts was to deprive her, a single mother, of the ability to support her children . All judges, however can develop empathy. And in telling the story of Helen Palsgraf, Judge Noonan makes a good case for why they should." [86]

In 2011, Cardi analyzed the present-day influence that Palsgraf has had on state courts. He found that neither Cardozo nor Andrews has won on the question of how duty of care is formulated, with courts applying policy analyses. "As to the proper doctrinal home for plaintiff-foreseeability, Cardozo has undoubtedly prevailed. Although a clear majority of jurisdictions state that duty is the proper home for plaintiff-foreseeability, Cardozo's vision of foreseeability as a categorical determination has not been widely adopted." [87] But, he noted, "Andrews may have found a back door to victory. Arguably the most important consequence of the Palsgraf decision, the resolution of the judge/jury question, appears to lean in Andrews' direction. A majority of courts prefer to leave foreseeability—even as a part of duty—to the jury." [87]

Scheppele put Palsgraf in social context, noting that 108 passengers were killed in railroad operations on the LIRR in 1924, a typical figure for it in the 1920s.

Social scientists of a more qualitative and historical bent would see the Palsgraf case as part of a long history in which the railroad industry imposed substantial costs on the broader society, costs that were never added to the ledgers of the railroads. Most train accidents were not litigated. Those that were shared the fate of Mrs. Palsgraf's: each case was taken on its own facts as an isolated, freak occurrence, and the broader consequence, in which death and injury became a normal byproduct of running the railroad, was disregarded. If judges could see—if not through statistics, then perhaps through the social history of the railroad industry—just how dangerous trains were and how much death and destruction they left in their path, they may have been less inclined to think that Mrs. Palsgraf's problem was that those two men carried fireworks onto the platform that day. [88]


§ 1983 Civil Rights Claims Follow Local Rules on Statutes of Limitations

For § 1983 lawsuits, the courts will apply the statute of limitations applicable to similar actions in the subject locale. In other words, for personal injury and wrongful death claims in New Mexico, the SOL will follow the local New Mexico rules. Thus, the statute of limitations for personal injury and wrongful death will apply as these are the most similar in nature to § 1983 claims.

The confusion arises because § 1983 civil rights claims are almost invariably filed against governmental entities, such as prisons which is where Collins & Collins, P.C. focuses much of its work. So the question arises as to which New Mexico statute of limitations on personal injury and wrongful death claims should apply in case of § 1983 civil rights claims, the general personal injury SOL or the SOL for suits against the government?

Fortunately, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals which governs New Mexico federal district court has ruled alleviating the confusion.


Video: the famous SOUR CREAM cake BEAR in the NORTH without eggs! MELTS in your mouth! Without a mixer! (Januari 2022).